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Cue phrases in disourse:
further evidene for the ore:ontributor distintion
Jon Oberlander and Johanna D. Moore
Division of Informatis, University of Edinburgh
1 Introdution
Moser and Moore (in prep) arried out a orpus
study of ue phrases in tutorial dialogue. Their
annotation uses Relational Disourse Analysis,
whih distinguishes ore elements (nulei-like)
from ontributors (satellite-like). In their
disussion of these results, Moser and Moore
laim that lauses in the ontributor:ore or-
der are harder to understand than lauses in
ore:ontributor order, but do not attempt to
explain why the \hard" order is ever used. Here,
we reruit evidene from work by Stevenson and
her ollaborators, whih substantiates the em-
pirial laim, and we then suggest that by distin-
guishing information struture (given-new) from
intentional struture (ore-ontributor), we an
explain why hard orders are surprisingly fre-
quent. Along the way (spae permitting), we
show how the ore:ontributor distintion an
help dissolve an empirial puzzle onerning ap-
parently ausal interpretations of the full stop.
2 Corpus observations
Moser and Moore (in prep) gathered, annotated
and analysed a orpus of tutorial dialogues, to
help investigate the distribution of disourse ue
phrases, suh as beause, also, although and rst.
They predited that both the ourrene and
plaement of suh ues were orrelated with the
funtional relationship of intentional subordina-
tion between disourse units. For them, `inten-
tional subordination ours when one disourse
unit, the ore, manifests a ommuniative pur-
pose and another disourse unit, a ontribu-
tor, helps to realize that purpose. Cues signal a
strutural or semanti aspet of how a ore and
its ontributors t together to form the segment'
(p. 2). The idea that speaker intentions ditate
the hierarhial struture of disourse, and that
the dening feature of a segment is that there be
a reognizable segment purpose, is due to Grosz
and Sidner (1986). The idea that disourse is hi-
erarhially strutured by pairwise relations in
whih one relatum (the nuleus) is more en-
tral to the speaker's purpose than the others
(the satellites) is due to Mann and Thomp-
son (1988). Moser and Moore (in prep) point
out the orrespondene between the relation of
dominane among intentions in Grosz and Sid-
ner and the nuleus-satellite distintion in RST.
In addition, several other models of disourse
exploit a similar devie (for instane, those due
to Hobbs 1985, Polanyi 1988, Redeker 1990).
Thus, Moser and Moore's annotation involved
oding up all the ore:ontributor relations in
the orpus, both within and between sentenes.
Note that here most of our examples are ases
of the former.
Turning to the analysis, we nd that, given a
pair of elements, one ontaining a ue phrase,
we an distinguish the linear (rst, seond) and
funtional (ore, ontributor) role of eah ele-
ment. Consider the two-lause examples here,
where the reommendation of testing is taken
to be the ore:
(1) a. Sine Part2 is more likely to be
damaged, you should test it rst.
[Contributor-1℄
b. Part2 is more likely to be damaged,
so you should test it rst. [Core-2℄
. You should test Part2 rst, beause
it is more likely to be damaged.
[Contributor-2℄
d. #So you should test Part2 rst,




order of Linear plaement of ue
relation First Seond Both
Core:ontributor 0 53 0
Contributor:ore 38 57 5
Table 1: Distribution of ues with respet to
both funtional and linear loation (n = 153).
Reprodued from Moore and Moser.
In (1a) and (1b), the lauses our in ontrib-
utor:ore order. In (1a), the ue ours on the
ontributor; ombining order and funtion, we
an all this a ontributor-1 plaement. In
(1b), the ue ours on the ore, and so we have
a ore-2 plaement for the ue. In (1) and
(1d), the lauses our in ore:ontributor or-
der. In (1), the ue ours on the ontributor,
and thus we have ontributor-2 plaement. In
(1d), we have plaed a ue on the ore, attempt-
ing a ore-1 plaement; however, this partiular
utterane is ill-formed.
Note in passing that in Relational Disourse
Analysis what makes one element the ore,
rather than the ontributor is a funtional mat-
ter, not a semanti one. Operationally, the dis-
ourse analyst takes a segment and determines
whih part of it is the ore by asking `what in-
formation the hearer is expeted to believe or
to understand as a result of the segment'; the
ontributing information is that whih is pro-
vided by the speaker so that the hearer is more
likely to believe or understand the ore. Thus,
there is no orrelation between auses and ores
or onsequenes and ontributors; the math or
mismath will depend on the ommuniative in-
tentions as determined in the spei ontext.
Returning to (1d), it is notable that one of
Moser and Moore's main ndings was that ue
phrases are never plaed on a ore whih o-
urs rst (ore-1). It's not just that so annot
our as ore-1; there is simply no ue that o-
urs there. When the ore omes rst, if a ue
phrase is used at all, it is plaed on the ontrib-
utor (ontributor-2). Table 1 summarises the
distributions.
Note that it is true that (in this and other or-
pora) ue phrases an our sentene-initially;
for instane, In order to lose the program, press
Order of Number of relations




Table 2: Cued relations tended to be in ontrib-
utor:ore order. Reprodued from Moore and
Moser.
F7. However, it is lear that some ues funtion
at a level below the intentional struture dened
by ore:ontributor relations. Arguably, this ex-
ample falls into that ategory, sine it appears
to fail the deletion and replaement diagnostis
for deteting intentional substruture (f. Mann
and Thompson 1988 on nulearity). Although
these ues and this level of struture are in-
luded in the full RDA analysis, they are not
the subjet of this paper. It is therefore possi-
ble that Moore and Moser's nding generalises:
there is a set of segments in whih ue phrases
our sentene-initially, and a set of segments
whih an be analysed into a ore and ontribu-
tor(s), with the ore rst; but these two sets are
disjoint.
They also note that ue phrases are in gen-
eral substantially more likely to our when the
ore follows the ontributor: in these ases, the
ue may be plaed on either the ontributor
(ontributor-1) or on the ore (ore-2). Table 2
summarises the relative frequenies of our-
rene versus non-ourrene. One other point
worth mentioning is that they found that par-
tiular ue phrases (suh as sine, so, beause or
this means) have preferred positions, and rarely
stray from them. Thus, sine, so, and beause
our almost always in the positions they o-
upy in (1) above; and this means always ours
in ore-2 position.
In their disussion of these results, Moser and
Moore raise two questions; rst:
The origin of order: What explains the rela-
tive order of ore and ontributor?
Their answer to this Origin question is that `In
ore:ontributor order, the ontext of interpre-
tation for the ontributor inludes the ore. We
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would expet that the ore would help a hearer
to understand the ontributor by motivating its
utterane. In ontributor:ore order, the on-
text of interpretation for the ontributor does
not inlude the ore. It may be more diÆult
to understand a relation in this order' (p. 42).
It is the relative diÆulty of the latter order
that leads speakers to use ue phrases more fre-
quently. It is thus marked in not one, but two
senses. Conversely, when the ore omes rst,
a ue indiating forthoming support for it is
superuous, sine whether it's supported or not
does not aet its interpretation.
It might be aepted that ore-1 ue phrases
do not our, but argued that this is just a
orollary of simple syntati ontraints on ue
phrases. We annot use subordinating onjun-
tions here, or oordinating onjuntions; and
onjuntives are out beause they are anaphori.
Thus, ease of proessing is immaterial: it's a
matter of the resoures available in the lan-
guage. Against this, it is worth noting two
points. First, there are ases in whih synta-
ti and intentional subordination do not line up,
whih undermines the general line of argument.
Seondly, of ourse, some would argue that the
syntax reets the funtionality (and hene the
psyholinguisti fats) rather than vie versa.
The seond question, following from this, is:
The existene of marked order: If
ontributor-ore order is harder to under-
stand, why is it ever used?
To this Existene question, they have no answer.
As a step towards answering it, in the next se-
tion, we onsider whether there is any empirial
support for their answer to the Origin question,
and in partiular, for the supposition that on-
tributor:ore order is relatively hard to under-
stand.
3 Is ontributor:ore order
hard?
Reading time and omprehension studies pro-
vide important soures of evidene regarding
relative ease of linguisti proessing. To ad-
dress the ontributor:ore issue, we need to look
at data that arries out the right omparisons;
in partiular, we require experimental materi-
als that manipulate ore:ontributor order (and
thus the onnetive) while maintaining the ma-
terials. The alternation between so and beause
we saw earlier provides one kind of test:
(1) b. Part2 is more likely to be damaged,
so you should test it rst. [Core-2℄
. You should test Part2 rst, beause
it is more likely to be damaged.
[Contributor-2℄
In (1b), we enounter a sentene in the (sup-
posedly marked) ontributor:ore order; in (1),
we enounter the same material re-ast in
ore:ontributor order. If the latter is \easier"
to understand, we would predit that it would
be read more quikly, and that people would be
more likely to understand it orretly. The gen-
eral question then is: are beause sentenes read
faster and understood better than so sentenes?
Stevenson and Urbanowiz (1995) arried out
a series of reading time studies whih bear di-
retly on this question. They were investigating
diering inuenes on the interpretation of pro-
nouns and proper names in disourse, and om-
paring eets due to entering (related to or-
der of mention) with those due to the themati
roles played by entities mentioned in the dis-
ourse, and those due to onnetives. The the-
mati roles under onsideration inluded: Goal,
Soure, Agent, Patient, Experiener and Stimu-
lus.
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Their materials exemplify a range of ma-
nipulations, some of whih an be seen in (2):
(2) a. Malolm won some money from
Stuart beause he was very good at
poker.
b. Malolm won some money from
Stuart beause he was very bad at
poker.
. Malolm won some money from
Stuart so he ended up feeling rih.
d. Malolm won some money from
Stuart so he ended up feeling poor.
1
For instane, a sentene's Goal is the entity towards
whih something moves, and the Soure is the entity
from whih it must move; an sentene's Experiener is
an entity having a given experiene, and the Stimulus is
the entity whih gives rise to that experiene.
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Sentenes like those in (2) plae the Goal rst
(and the Soure seond) in the rst lause; fur-
ther materials use verbs (suh as lost to) whih
plae the Goal seond (and the Soure rst).
The (a) and (b) ases use beause, and the ()
and (d) ases use so; the (a) and () ases in-
volve pronominal referene to the Goal, and the
(b) and (d) ases involve pronominal referene
to the Soure. Further materials make the sub-
sequent referenes by using repeated names in-
stead of pronouns (e.g., Malolm instead of he
in (2a)). With all these materials, subjets ar-
ried out a self-paed reading task. Eah sentene
was presented one lause at a time, and after the
seond lause had been read, a yes/no question
was presented, the answer to whih indiated
how the pronoun had been assigned (in the pro-
noun ondition, exemplied here). Time to read
the seond lause in milliseonds was reorded.
The materials were onstruted this way be-
ause Stevenson's own hypothesis is that prefer-
enes due to entering onstraints interat with
those due to the themati roles of the entities
referred to. On this view, entering primarily
inuenes how an entity introdued in one sen-
tene will be referred to in the next (by pro-
noun, or by name, for instane); themati roles
inuene whih entities will be subsequently re-
ferred to (the Goal, or the Soure, from the rst
sentene, for instane). We will return shortly
to the speis of Stevenson and Urbanowiz's
preditions. For the moment, however, let us
fous on one aspet of their results, whih bears
diretly on our urrent onern.
Analysis of variane showed a signiant main
eet of onnetive on reading time: `lauses
were read more quikly in beause than in so
sentenes' (p. 330): mean times were 1676ms
versus 1926ms. There was a marginally signif-
iant main eet on omprehension auray:
`There were more orret responses when the
questions were onneted by beause rather than
so' (p. 331): mean auray was 91% orret
versus 83%. The signiant reading time eet
was repliated when repeated names were used
in plae of pronouns: lauses were read faster in
the beause ondition: mean times were 1555ms
versus 1754ms.
Reall now that the beause sentenes present
information in ore:ontributor order, and so
present it in ontributor:ore order. Steven-
son and Urbanowiz's results thus provide initial
support for the view that ore:ontributor order
is easier to proess, both in terms of speed and
auray. Obviously, suh support is ompati-
ble with other explanations, inluding, perhaps,
those disussed in Noordman's talk at this work-
shop, involving ioni and non-ioni ordering
of ause and onsequene. To show that it is
ore:ontributor order that determines ease of
proessing, we would have to go on to deal with
other ue phrase pairs, and non-ausal onne-
tions in partiular.
4 A puzzle onerning full
stops and ausality
In this and previous studies (f. Stevenson,
Crawley and Kleinman 1994, whih uses ontin-
uation rather than reading time tasks), Steven-
son has argued that entering, themati roles
and onnetives (or the lak of expliit onne-
tives) all interat. In partiular, entering tells
us to expet a pronoun in subjet position to
speify the highest ranked Cf from the previ-
ous lause. On the other hand, themati role
information tells us to expet that the subjet
of the urrent lause is more likely to speify
an entity assoiated with the onsequenes of
the event introdued in the previous lause. For
example, if the verb in the previous sentene
introdued roles for Goal and Soure, then the
subjet of the urrent sentene is most likely to
be the Goal from the previous sentene. Finally,
however, expetations relating to the onne-
tive an interfere with those arising from the-
mati role and entering. Stevenson, Crawley
and Kleinman (1994:538) nd, for instane, that
people produe signiantly more ontinuations
referring to the Experiener in ompletions of
so fragments like (3a), and more ontinuations
referring to Stimulus in beause fragments like
(3b).
(3) a. Ken admired Geo so he . . .
(he = Ken)
b. Ken admired Geo beause he . . .
(he = Geo)
. Ken admired Geo and he . . .
(he = Ken)
d. Ken admired Geo. He . . .
(He = Geo)
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Thus, beause refousses attention on auses,
instead of onsequenes. In itself, this seems
plausible. However, there is an interesting puz-
zle assoiated with Experiener-Stimulus sen-
tenes. With Goal-Soure or Agent-Patient sen-
tenes, there is no dierene between the pref-
erenes whih arise in ontinuations leading to
two lauses onneted by and, and those in on-
tinuations leading to two sentenes onneted
by the full stop. But with Experiener-Stimulus
sentenes, it seems that and patterns with so,
and the general expetation of a fous on on-
sequenes. By ontrast, the full stop patterns
with beause, and reverses the general prefer-
ene. Stevenson, Crawley and Kleinman state:
`It is likely that the use of a new sentene for
the ontinuation . . . led to a fous on the ause
of the desribed state of aairs' (p. 535).
This ertainly seems to desribe the behaviour.
However, the idea that full stop is a ausal
onnetive seems inonsistent with intuitively
\ioni" behaviour in, for example, narrative
onstrution, whereby we desribe eventualities
in the order in whih they ourred. If I intro-
due a state (suh as The room was pith dark.),
I might well go on to desribe an event whih
ours against the bakground of that state, or
whih is enabled by it. It seems somewhat less
likely that I will start to explain the auses of
the state. The aount proposed by Lasarides,
Asher and Oberlander (1992), for instane, goes
to onsiderable lengths to show how suh ap-
parent departures from the default of ioniity
an be aptured formally. For them, full stops
mean temporal progress, exept in speial dis-
ourse ontexts, or if speial world knowledge
is in play. How, then, an we reonile Steven-
son et al.'s nding with the onsensus regarding
temporal ordering in disourse?
The answer lies in naive expetations onerning
ores and ontributors. Given the results from
Stevenson and Urbanowiz's reading time stud-
ies, we now have reason to believe that multi-
lause sentenes in ore:ontributor order are in-
deed relatively easy to proess. As we know, this
helps explain why ore-1 position (a ore our-
ring before a ontributor) does not attrat a ue
phrase. The ore an stand on its own; if a on-
tributor is supplied rst, then a onnetive is ap-
parently highly desirable, either in ontributor-1
position, or in ore-2 position. Now, onsider
an experimental subjet in Stevenson et al.'s
experiment. They are presented with a single
sentene, terminated by a full stop, and then
asked to produe a new sentene to ontinue on
from the rst. A very natural way of dealing
with this task is to assume that they have been
given the important information, and that they
an hang some new supporting information o
it. It seems muh less likely that they will inter-
pret the bare initial sentene as merely designed
to support some other, more exiting sentene
about an event that they will have to think up.
In other words, presented with a single sentene,
I will assume it is a ore, and produe a ontrib-
utor to go with it. I will not assume that it is
a ontributor, and work out what ore it ould
have been ontributing to.
What kind of ontributor would I produe under
these irumstanes? Connetives oer a use-
ful guide. Considering the results of Moser and
Moore's orpus study, we an ask whih on-
netives are ompatible with ore:ontributor
order. They are those that usually our in
ontributor-2 position: beause, rst, seond,
however and also.
2
Of these, beause is twie
as frequent as any other. So, when ores are fol-
lowed by ontributors, if we use a onnetive at
all, beause is our favourite. If we don't use a
onnetive, and indeed plae the ore and on-
tributor in separate sentenes, then it plausi-
ble to suppose that we will still try to gener-
ate a ontributor that oheres with the given
ore. And a ause is an exellent andidate un-
der these irumstanes: thus, we should not
be surprised if subjets' behaviour bears an un-
anny resemblane to what they do when they
are onfronted with a sentene fragment on-
taining beause.
The ruial point to note, perhaps, is that
Stevenson's suggestion was prompted by sub-
jets' ontinuation behaviour in a supposedly
\null" ontext: they were given the rst sen-
tene in a disourse, and asked to produe the
seond. The unusual nature of this disourse
ontext brings us bak to address Moser and
Moore's seond question, onerning the very
existene of ontributor:ore order utteranes.
2
Sine an also our in ontributor-2 position, but
this use is muh rarer than its ourrene in ontributor-
1 position.
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5 Why does ontributor:
ore order our at all?
If ontributor:ore order is harder to under-
stand, why is it ever used? If we an say (1),
why would we ever say (1b) or (1a)?
(1) a. Sine part2 is more likely to be
damaged, you should test it rst.
[Contributor-1℄
b. Part2 is more likely to be damaged,
so you should test it rst. [Core-2℄
. You should test Part2 rst, beause
it is more likely to be damaged.
[Contributor-2℄
The basi answer lies in the information stru-
ture of the utterane seen against its wider dis-
ourse ontext. Within a disourse ontext, the
\harder" order may be less oherent loally, but
more oherent globally. Thus, although dispre-
ferred on loal grounds, it may be required on
global grounds.
Elhadad and MKeown (1990) point out that a
Hallidean given-new distintion applies within
sentenes like (1b) and (1). In partiular, fol-
lowing Halliday, the unmarked position for new
information is seen to be towards the end of the
sentene. So, sentenes usually present informa-
tion in given{new order. Consider (1b) embed-
ded in a larger disourse ontext, and ompare
it with embedding (1) in the same ontext:
(4) a. Part2 has probably been damaged,
but Part1 has not.
b. Part2 is more likely to be damaged,
so you should test it rst.
(5) a. Part2 has probably been damaged,
but Part1 has not.
b. You should test Part2 rst, beause
it is more likely to be damaged.
Given this (onstruted) ontext, it seems
highly appropriate to say that Part2 is more
likely to be damaged is given in (4b), and that
you should test it rst is new. But if this is or-
ret, then (5b) presents this same information in
new{given order. If information is presented in
this order without any fany syntati onstru-
tion (like an it-left), then arguably the reader
or listener will have to arry out extra work.
In the absene of information to the ontrary,
we use the early part of the sentene to provide
a link in to the prior disourse ontext, and we
then attah the later part of the sentene to this
link. If new information is presented rst, then
extra inferential eort will be required to nd a
plae to link it into the prior disourse|or the
listener will just have to wait until the linking
ontext arrives, later in the sentene.
To avoid this extra work, the remedy is that
ores should be demoted to seond plae if they
are new to the disourse. And beause (as we
have seen) they are harder to understand when
they our in seond plae, a range of onne-
tives is available to help readers build an ap-
propriate interpretation of the ontributor:ore
struture in whih they appear.
The key point is that intentional subordi-
nation varies independently from information
struture|information struture in the sense of
given versus new information, that is. Moser
and Moore (1996) have already elaborated the
argument for intentional subordination to be
seen as independent from information stru-
ture in the sense of ontent relations, suh as
ause versus onsequene. What the urrent
disussion suggests is that one annot aount
for the distributional fats about ue phrases
purely at the intentional level. The information-
strutural level is needed if a full aount is to
be provided.
How ould we test these laims? We ould on-
dut a reading time experiment in whih we test:
(a) how quikly people read mathed onstru-
tions suh as A so B and B beause A without a
prior disourse ontext; and ompare this with
(b) how quikly they read the same materials in
a disourse ontext C in whih A is given, and
B is new; and with () how quikly they read
them in another ontext C
0
, in whih A is new
and B is given.
We would predit that: in (a), so is slower than
beause; in (b), the dierene in speed is redued
or reversed; and in (), the dierene is the same
as in (a) or inreased.
6
6 Conlusion
It seems, then, that onstrutions likeA so B are
less internally oherent than onstrutions like
B beause A. There's empirial evidene whih
suggests they're harder to understand; and this
supports the view that the diÆulty arises be-
ause A so B is a ontributor:ore onstrution,
while B beause A is a ore:ontributor onstru-
tion. However, given the right disourse on-
text, A so B an have an information struture
whih oheres with that ontext where B beause
A's information struture proves less oherent
(and vie versa for a dierent ontext). This
suggestion is empirially testable. If it is or-
ret, then it helps explain Moore and Moser's
puzzle; it would explain why ontributor:ore
onstrutions|as in A so B|are surprisingly
frequent, and demonstrably eetive.
We onlude with a general moral, whih links
this suggestion bak to the disussion of the sup-
posedly ausal interpretation of full stops. As
Altmann and Steedman (1988) have said: there
is no suh thing as a null ontext.
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